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Avis Budget Makes $491 Million Offer to Acquire Zipcar

Via The Wall Street Journal

Avis Budget Group Inc., once a skeptic about car sharing services, agreed to buy short-term rental pioneer Zipcar Inc. (ZIP) for $491 million, signaling a shift in the industry to embracing drivers who don’t want to own cars.

With the Zipcar deal, Avis Budget becomes the latest company to pursue the fast-growing market for young, urban customers who want to rent cars by the hour, rather than owning their own vehicles. Enterprise Holdings Inc. and Hertz Global Holdings Inc. (HTZ), the two largest U.S. car-rental companies, have already rolled out offerings for such customers.

Avis Budget Chief Executive Officer Ron Nelson said he’d been “somewhat dismissive of car sharing in the past,” in a call with analysts today. He said he had a change of heart when he realized how much growth and profit potential there is in providing hourly rentals to “younger, more wired consumers” in big cities and on college campuses worldwide.

[Full article here]


BP’s Good Deal With Rosneft

Via NBC

There are lots of winners in the agreement by Russian oil giant Rosneft (ROSN:RM) to buy BP’s stake in the TNK-BP joint venture. But no company stands to gain more than BP (BP).

For starters, BP will walk away from TNK-BP with $12.3 billion to $13 billion in cash, bringing to more than $30 billion its total return on an $8 billion investment it made only nine years ago.The company will extricate itself from a venture that, while profitable, caused seemingly endless headaches. And by getting a stake of up to 20 percent in Rosneft as part of the deal, the London-based oil giant is positioning itself to play a leading role in Arctic oil exploration, whose growth potential greatly exceeds that of the aging Siberian oil fields that TNK-BP has operated.

All this will advance BP’s effort to remake itself in the wake of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, which wiped out one-third of its market value. Since the spill, the company has shed some $33 billion in assets as it tries to focus on more-profitable crude oil exploration. With the Rosneft deal, BP is pocketing enough cash to cushion itself against costs from the spill—with money left over to finance possible acquisitions, says Neil Shah, global head of research at Edison Investment Research in London. “This is a game-changing day for BP and its international strategy,” he says.

[Full article here]


AOL and the Case Against Efficient Market Theory

From Businessweek

This time last week, I, like nine out of every 10 investors, believed AOL (AOL) was a dead-end investment. How could it not be? This is no longer a 56k, dial-up world, when those ubiquitous AOL disks inundated mailboxes. AOL botched the chance to morph into a broadband player with its spectacularly bad marriage to Time Warner (TWX). AOL is behind on social media, and is struggling to compete for ad dollars with Google (GOOG) and Facebook. Its sales declined in each quarter last year.

How many chances does a legacy company get? (Remember this reinvention?)

Then, on April 9, as if out of nowhere, Microsoft (MSFT)dropped in to buy $1 billion of AOL’s patents, sending the latter’s shares up 43 percent in a single day. In the two years leading up to the deal, the stock was down 37 percent.

[Full story here]


“Firm Excellence” by Phin Upham

Via the Academic Ledger

By Phin Upham

Excerpt

The resource based point of view, which conceives of a firms resource as its bundle of capabilities, begins with organizational routines, which are build up as a confluence of both the individual skills and the organizational physical memory and physical equipment configuration, allow for organizational capabilities.Capabilities, though, cannot be of the common garden variety if they are to be valuable. Jay Barney (1991) argues that if capabilities are to confer strategic advantage, they must be of a special type. They must do more than be useful, they must confer a sustained competitive advantage. Petraf (1993) lays out nicely the necessary conditions for sustained competitive advantage in a resource based view. She shows how the resource view resets in imperfect information and non-transferable assets. This implies that other firms are unable to duplicate (at least in the medium term) the advantages that the capabilities confer. In order for a resource (or capability, which can be seen as a sort of resource) to act as a source of competitive advantage, it must be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and without common, imitable, or strategically equivalent substitutes. Further, as McGrath, MacMillian, Venkataraman (1995) point out, a capabilities is lodges in and rests on team work between members of a firm trying to accomplish specific goal, their work is lodged in turn in physical assets, informational assets, and structural attributes.

Diericks and Cool (1989) elaborate further on how these firm level capabilities might work. They describe how strategic asset stocks can be seen as flowing over time – either rising or falling. Thus, many capabilities grow over time, they cannot be acquired immediately. This is due to time compression diseconomies, asset mass efficiency, causal ambiguity, and a number of other factors elaborated on. Jan Rivkin (2001) describes how capabilities must not be too complex or they will be un-imitable within the company (the company cannot take full advantage for them) nor to simple, or every other competitor will copy them (a la White Castle in Winter and Szulanski (2000)).

Via the Academic Ledger[Full article here]


“Stick With What You Know?” by Phin Upham

Via Watching the Economy

By contributor Phin Upham

Excerpt

This essay contributes to the theory of the economic literature in which it lies, but it also indirectly contributes to management literature and has some very interesting potential implications for business organization. If a firm has a core market and there is some slack or market failure for the firm’s factors in this market, the firm might do well to transfer these resources to another market. But two problems arise, both of which Montgomery and Wernerfelt describe and differentiate clearly. Firstly, the authors argue that the more the diversification the more average firm rents are expected to decrease. This is supported by the double point that 1) the wide diversification implies less specified assets which can be so diversified, and 2) the factors transferred should have some decrease in rent generating ability when transferred to a new market. The second problem with diversifying for a firm relates to the value of the factors. Montgomery and Wernerfelt make two claims about this: 1) the more distant the factor transfer form the old market (as measured by the critical factors which the new market differ from the old market) the lower the rent and 2) the more specialized the factors are to the original market both the more rent they extract and the greater loss they have in rent extraction capacity when transferred.

Click here for more articles from author and investor Phin Upham


Fed’s Bullard says housing market has hit bottom

Story via CNN Money.

By Greg Robb

The U.S. housing market has already hit bottom, said James Bullard, the president of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, on Monday. In comments to reporters, according to Dow Jones Newswires, Bullard said that he expects the unemployment rate to fall below 8% this year. Bullard noted that he is more bullish than some forecasters. Bullard’s comments came after a speech in which he raised doubts about the Fed’s zero-interest rate policy. In general, hawks on the Fed, such as Bullard, have been more upbeat about the economy than doves, who believe growth is too subdued to bring down the high unemployment rate.

[Full story here]


Why Firms Win

Story via Watching the Economy.

Contributed by Phin Upham

There are many views in organizational theory which can explain why some firms are better at doing certain things than others, why some firms have a sustainable “competitive advantage.” One source of advantage for firms can be argued to be a form of the dynamic capabilities view. The so-called capabilities view, alone, is a very powerful group of ideas. It explains, I think, much of the successes, failures, and sources of struggle that the business world travails. The dynamic capabilities view adds some complexity – and it is especially valuable in times of uncertainly to change. But its added value is, I believe, sometimes overstated by the authors of essays on the topic. While it is important, a firm that has good capabilities and a fairly rational structure captures much of the competitive advantage that is relevant. Dynamic capabilities, which adds on the “learning to learn” piece of the puzzle, as far as it goes beyond normal firm learning (it would be unfair to say that every firm, even a normally well functioning one, has a dynamic capability to learn from itself – this would debase the term into a truism. So I limit it to well above average or explicit sorts of abilities to “learn to learn”), is a marginal improvement.

The capabilities point of view for organizations is underpinned by the work of Nelson and Winter (1982) “Organizational Capabilities and Behavior.” This view begins with the level of the individual – suggesting that in individuals, skilled behavior is a product of routine, tacit knowledge and a product of past behavior/learning. This essay relaxes some of the assumptions of classical micro-economics including inputs are homogenous, entrepreneurs are identical, firms optimize, etc.. In fact, Nelson and Winter argue, decisions in organizations may not be optimal, they may just be the descriptions that either personal experience or organizational memory imply. Organizational memory, accessed and contributed to by individuals, exists in individuals personal and organizational experience, external memory (such as files), and the physical state of the plant itself. Nelson and Winter generalize from this individual perspective (influenced by the work of Simon on organization and Kohneman and Tversky on heuristics) to apply this view of “evolutionary economics” to an organizational level. So, the theory is build up from the micro to the macro level in such a way as there is both a conceptual parallel between the micro and the macro, and that there is also a causal link between the behavior of individuals in a firm and the nature and behavior of the capabilities of that firm.

[Full story here]

Phin Upham has studied at the Wharton School of Business, and is an investor specializing in macroeconomics and illiquid assets. Contact Phin Upham at PhinUpham.com.


Made In The USA: Saving The American Brand

Story via NPR.

A majestic building still dominates the skyline of Rochester, N.Y., the word “Kodak” shining brightly from the top. It’s the legacy of George Eastman — the founder of the Eastman Kodak Co. — a company that helped Rochester thrive and gave it the nickname “Kodak Town.”

In 1976, Kodak sold 90 percent of the film around the world. The company basically invented digital photography, but it couldn’t figure out how to make the transition from film quickly enough to out-compete its Asian rivals. Of the 20 best-selling digital cameras in the U.S., not a single one is from Kodak.

Today, Kodak is barely a shadow of its former self. Earlier this month, the company that in 1982 once employed more than 60,000 people in Rochester — but now has fewer than 7,000 workers there — filed for bankruptcy protection.

[Full story here]


Good Firm vs. Bad Firm

By Phin Upham

Scholars often say that there are good firms and bad firms. Here Phin Upham looks at a seminal work which challenges some of these findings.

In Thomas H. Brush and Philip Bromiley’s What Does a Small Corporate Effect Mean? A Variance Components Simulation of Corporate and Businesses Effects, they analyze, reinterpreted, and retest Rumelt’s 1991 essay on corporate effects. In 1991, Rumelt had argues that the corporate effect on the variance of company performance is very small. This implies that strategy does not matter very much, since it makes so little difference. Brush and Bromiley argue that Rumelt did not interprets his statistical metrics well enough – that what he though he found was in fact not as telling or as robust as he believed. To prove this, they construct a simulation where there was important corporate effects and then used Rumelt’s “variance component analysis” metrics to test under what conditions we may get Rumelt-like results and what this means. This tact shows that value of researchers laying out their methods clearly, not only for later critiques but also for this kind of reproducibility and critical analysis.

Rumelt has taken up the gauntlet where Schmalensee (1985) had left off. Schmalensee had analyzed a variance model of firm performance studying firm, industry, and market share (for business units effects) and concluded that industry effects explained 19 percent of variance of rated of return and neither firm effects not market share are significant in explaining variance of return. Rumelt placed intra-firm level data into the analysis and decomposed the line of business profitability over time into corporate, business, industry, and other effects. He used variance components to estimate his model. Variance components are a tool in econometrics which, in order to control for some unknowable effect in each firm, assumes that each firm effect has an additional constant value u(i) randomly drawn form some population. This helps us to find the mean an and variance of u(i) as a population. But it is unclear how we ought to interpret the results we get from this strategy.

This variance components approach is used in genetics, but in this case special formulas and carefully designed experiments are used to ensure that this measure contributes rather than misleads. Rumelt uses variance components as a way to avoid dealing with model details, according to Brush and Bromiley, geneticists pay close attention to such factors.

Rumelt’s results are what has caused such a stir and provoked such an extensive rebuttal. He found that 46 percent of variance is explained by business unit effects, 8 percent is associated with industry effects and 1 percent with corporate effects. In short “if one business unit within a corporation is very profitable, there is little reason to expect that any of the corporation’s other business units will be performing at other than the norms set by industry, year, and industry-year effects.” (827). Rumelt is claiming that firms do not have any, or at least not much, ability to transfer success between product lines, in other words firms have few resources (in the RBV view) which can be applied internally to help them survive. This does not, it seems to me, contradict the possibility that a firm had an above average return or capability in some one division or another, only that a firm’s successes in one area do not transfer over (a strong version of Winter’s ideas on replication between product lines might be a consistent explanatory mechanism here).

But Brush and Bromiley have some very serious counter arguments to Rumelt’s conclusions. First, they argue that what his results appeared to say was not in fact what they necessarily meant. While the theory of variance components has been well developed, they argue, to interpret the effects of other variables, it is not as facile in actually measuring the relative importance of its estimates. In other words, Rumelt “makes statements of importance based on explained variance rather than an estimated parameter” (828). Brush and Bromiley take an unlikely, but ingenious, tact to establish their rebuttals to Rumelt. They construct a simulation in which they know there are significant firm effects and then they apply Rumelt’s analysis onto it. They are testing for two questions 1) the relative magnitude of a variance component as it relates to indicators of that particular effect. Rumelt is testing for some systematic advantage that is bestowed onto a division (say, by a manager) in virtue of being a part of a firm. Brush and Bromiley argue that this is too narrow a definition, a firm might have a unit performing less well in order to get extraordinary return in another unit, for example. This leads to question 2) how does shifting the number of business units influenced by corporate effects affect the measure of the variance component associated with corporate effect (829)? IN short, how does the size of the corporate effect pan out in the variance component and what might happen to the variance component if we don’t assume homogeneous corporate effects over business units.

Brush and Bromiley generate a simulation set of data and then measure scale (the difference between the performance of the top quartile of business units in a firm and the bottom quartile.). They believe that this will help them answer the first question above. To answer the second question they measure ROA for the top and bottom quartile and believe that this gets at the corporate affect on the business. They find that when scale is 1 (corporate and business unit effect identical) they get similar variance component measures, but when scale is .6, the variance component under represents this at .38, and when the scale is .2, the component variance is essentially zero at .03. this is the component variance Rumelt fount (1.5%). A scale of .20 implies, in Brush and Bromiley’s analysis, that the relevant importance of the corporation is 20 percent as important as the business unit. Thus, the authors conclude, variance component magnitudes do not reflect importance in a linear manner. Instead, variance components appear to be the square of importance.

Similarly, that the size of the industry variance components is 1/6 th that of the size of the business unit variance does not imply that the importance of the first is 1/6th the importance of the second. This means that the industry is 40 percent as important as the business unit. Lastly, the results vary significantly over simulations. Since the data is randomly drawn from the population, different draws get different results. This gives Brush and Bromiley yet another reason to question Rumelt’s conclusions. In conclusion, Brush and Bromiley say that Rumelt’s findings should be interpreted to mean that 1) corporate effect is not overwhelming and 2) corporate effect is significantly smaller than business unit effect (but not unimportant).

The authors have put much time and energy into critiquing the methods of a past scholar, whom they seem to nevertheless respect enormously. I personally question the use of “scale” as measures by the different between top and bottom quartiles because I think that this looses too much intra-firm information about profit, but I am not well versed enough in variance component methodology to critique the model or the model’s counter arguments fully. But I do admire the care and rigor of the authors. Whether right or wrong (I would love to see Rumelt’s response to this) they liven the debate in strategy and challenge a study they believe erroneous. I think the field would benefit from this sort of rigorous challenging of theories in order to synthesis and test results.

Phin Upham has studied at the Wharton School of Business, and is an investor specializing in macroeconomics and illiquid assets. Contact Phin Upham at PhinUpham.com.


Diamondback to settle insider-trading charges

Article via Reuters

Diamondback Capital Management will pay more than $9 million to settle allegations of insider trading at the Stamford, Connecticut-based hedge fund.

Diamondback will give up $6 million in ill-gotten gains and pay a $3 million penalty, as part of the proposed settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and a non-prosecution agreement with the Justice Department.

In reaching the settlement, the SEC said it credited Stamford, Connecticut-based Diamondback for its “substantial” cooperation, including a statement of facts that the hedge fund provided to the SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.

[Full story here]